Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write? by Luca Anderlini et al.









Abstract. We nd an economic rationale for the common sense answer to
the question in our title | courts (that maximize the parties' welfare under a veil of
ignorance) should not always enforce what the contracting parties write. Courts can
improve on the outcome that the parties would achieve without their intervention.
We study a buyer-seller model with risk-neutral agents and asymmetric information.
The court must decide when to uphold a contract and when to void it. The parties know
their private information at the time of contracting, and this drives a wedge between
ex-ante and interim-ecient contracts. In particular, if the court enforces all contracts,
inecient pooling obtains in equilibrium. By voiding some contracts the court is able
to induce them to separate, and hence improve ex-ante welfare.
Our results can also be interpreted as supporting the normative case for mandatory
rules in contract law.
JEL Classification: C79, D74, D89, K40, L14.
Keywords: Optimal Courts, Informational Externalities, Ex-Ante Welfare.
Address for correspondence: Leonardo Felli, Department of Economics, London
School of Economics and Political Science, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, United
Kingdom. lfelli@econ.lse.ac.uk
We wish to thank an anonymous referee, Lucien Bebchuk, Ian Gale, Oliver Hart, Elisabetta Iossa,
John Moore, Stephen Morris, Francesco Parisi, Steven Shavell, Alan Schwartz and seminar participants at
the ALEA 2007 meetings, ESSET (Gerzensee), Birkbeck, Birmingham, Cambridge, Case Western Reserve
University Law School, CESifo (Munich), Ente Einaudi (Rome), Harvard, LSE, Mannheim, Yale and WZB
(Berlin) for stimulating discussions and comments. Anderlini and Postlewaite gratefully acknowledge nancial
support from the National Science Foundation.Luca Anderlini, Leonardo Felli and Andrew Postlewaite 1
1. Introduction
Courts are active players in contractual relationships between economic agents. They rou-
tinely intervene in contractual disputes, excusing performance called for in the contract be-
cause of intervening events. Yet, in most of modern economic theory courts are treated (often
not even modeled, but left in the background) as passive enforcers of the will of the parties
embodied in their contractual agreements.
This simplistic view of the role of courts stems from the fact that in a world with complete
contracts, to behave as a passive enforcer is clearly the best that a court that is interested in
maximizing contracting parties' welfare can do. In the \classical" world of modern economic
theory, contracts are complete.
In a world in which complete contracts are not feasible it is no longer obvious that a court
should be a passive enforcer, and in fact it is no longer true. For example, the contracting
parties may face some uninsurable risk and the court may improve their welfare if it is able
to use some information available ex-post and excuse performance in some eventualities.1
Once the way for an active court is open, a host of related questions naturally arise. The
aim of this paper is to address the following one. Suppose that the court cannot condition
(ex-ante or ex-post) on any variable that cannot be contracted on by the parties themselves.
Is it then the case that the court's intervention can play any welfare-enhancing role?
The answer to the question above is \yes" if the parties are asymmetrically informed at
the time they contract and the court maximizes their ex-ante welfare, that is, their expected
welfare before either party gets information not available to the other. Asymmetry in the
parties' information at the time they contract can lead to a \lemons-like" situation in which
adverse selection leads to inecient contracts. Courts that do not simply enforce contracts
as they are written can sometimes ameliorate the ineciency that results from asymmetric
information.
We provide an example in which this is indeed the case. We also derive the optimal
decision rule for an active welfare-maximizing court. This rule implies that the court in
equilibrium voids contracts that the contracting parties, at the contracting stage, would like
the court to enforce.
1This is the case, for example, in Anderlini, Felli, and Postlewaite (2007).Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write? 2
The potential benet of a court's voiding explicit contractual clauses stems from asym-
metry of information between the parties at the time they contract. Because of asymmetric
information, when the court does not intervene, inecient trades may take place. This is
because in the absence of the court's intervention the contracting party that does have pri-
vate information may have an incentive not to disclose it. This will force the other party
to accept the contract while still uninformed possibly luring him into an inecient trade.
In other words, in equilibrium some (inecient) pooling may obtain. By intervening and
voiding some contractual clauses, the court may be able to negate the incentives for the in-
formed party to hide his private information, thus making the pooling no longer protable
for him. In other words, voiding contracts in some cases will decrease the expected gain from
withholding private information, thereby promoting disclosure and hence increasing ex-ante
welfare.2 In the example below the court's intervention takes the form of voiding extreme
contracts: trading contracts that specify exceedingly high prices.
The view that courts should maximize ex-ante welfare is a compelling one. If the parties
were able to meet at the ex-ante stage (when they are symmetrically informed), agreements
could be reached that circumvent ineciencies that are unavoidable at the interim stage
when the parties have private information. A court that maximizes ex-ante expected welfare
will choose the same contingent rules of behavior as the parties would have chosen at that
stage, had it been possible. In other words, if the parties could meet at that point, they
might instruct the court to void some contracts they might subsequently write. They will
do this precisely because the parties will understand that while they may regret this in some
circumstances, it may promote the disclosure of private information and in expectation they
will be better o. The problem that the court is solving is that the parties are often unable to
meet before the arrival of their private information. In other words, a court that maximizes
ex-ante welfare acts as a commitment device that remedies the parties' inability to contract
at the ex-ante stage.
We model the court as a \Stackelberg leader." Before any uncertainty is realized and any
contracts are drawn up, the court publicly announces the rules that it will follow to settle
a possible dispute. Courts do not in actuality commit to the rules by which disputes will
2In our example below the court's intervention is not just welfare-enhancing; it achieves the actual rst
best. Obviously, this need not be the case in general. For example, in Anderlini, Felli, and Postlewaite (2007)
the court's intervention is welfare-enhancing, but does not achieve the 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be settled; instead, courts decide after they know the details of the dispute. Nevertheless,
over time the accumulated decisions that courts have made in a broad array of cases creates
a set of precedents that shape how future disputes will be settled. The rule of precedents
(stare decisis) guarantees that a court, when asked to rule on a dispute is bound, at least to
some extent, by the ruling implied by the accumulated precedents.3 Rather than model this
gradual evolution of the way contractual disputes are resolved we treat the court as choosing,
once and for all, an optimal rule.4
Our aim is not to suggest that there is an easy rule that courts can apply to void par-
ticular contracts that come before them. Indeed, in the example below, a court would need
substantial detail of the parties' circumstances to know precisely when contractual perfor-
mance should be excused. Rather, the central point is that there are circumstances in which
voiding contracts that parties would like the court to uphold can be welfare enhancing.
It is clear that our arguments apply equally well to legislators choosing whether to impose
any mandatory rules in contract law. That these rules will be anticipated by the parties
is trivial in this case. Equally clear is the fact that our arguments above also constitute a
compelling case for the fact that the normative role of legislators should be that of maximizing
the parties' ex-ante welfare.5
In our view, the key dierence between these two interpretations is informational. Our
results show that court intervention is optimal in some cases. In just the same way, mandatory
rules will be welfare-enhancing when aimed at some subset of contracting parties but not
when aimed at others. It seems likely that, especially in a regime of \case law," courts will be
able to better tailor their intervention to the class of cases that needs it than the legislators.
Statute books are changed less often than cases are ruled on by courts, and the information
available to legislators is less sensitive to the heterogeneity of characteristics of the pool of
cases that the courts review.
3The denition of stare decisis from the Wex on-line legal dictionary and encyclopedia at the Law School
of Cornell University, (http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/index.php/Stare decisis) reads as follows:
\Latin for `to stand by things decided.' Stare decisis is essentially the doctrine of precedent. Courts cite to
stare decisis when an issue has been previously brought to the court and a ruling already issued. Generally,
courts will adhere to the previous ruling, though this is not universally true."
4See Anderlini, Felli, and Riboni (2010) for a paper that explicitly models the dynamic evolution of
precedents and its implications for the eciency of court rulings.
5The role of legislators in shaping mandatory rules is also clearly akin to the role of regulators in certain
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Throughout the paper, we give more emphasis to the interpretation of our results con-
cerning court intervention as opposed to mandatory rules because of this last consideration.
Nevertheless, we believe that our results are useful in both guises.
1.1. The Role of Courts in Promoting Disclosure of Information
Our aim is to highlight how the rules that courts use in adjudicating contractual issues
can potentially increase the information available to contracting parties, and consequently,
aect the parties' welfare. Historically, courts have had an interest in promoting disclosure
of information at least since the English case of Hadley vs. Baxendale in 1854.6 The court
held in that case that a defendant who breached a contract was liable only for damages that
might reasonably have arisen given the known facts rather than the higher damages that were
actually suered because of circumstances known only to the plainti. As argued in Adler
(1999), the limitation on damages implicit in the Hadley rule is a default that is often viewed
as promoting disclosure: \A party who will suer exceptional damages from breach need only
communicate her situation in advance and gain assent to allowance so that the damages are
unmistakably in the contemplation of both parties' at the time of contract."7 The discussion
of the role of courts in promoting information disclosure, to our knowledge, focusses primarily
on the benet of disclosure to the contracting parties. In the absence of disclosure, resources
will be wasted in writing needless waiver clauses and inecient precaution.
Courts will have an interest in promoting disclosure of information in our model, but for
a very dierent reason, and with very dierent consequences. Courts will aect the amount
of information that is revealed by informed parties through their treatment of contracts
that reveal little information. While contracts may reveal little information simply because
the parties have little information, courts will treat such contracts more harshly than they
otherwise might because of the incentive eects such treatment will have on informed parties.
Those with relevant information will reveal it in order that courts will more likely enforce the
agreements that are made. Thus, courts are not examining a contract brought before them
solely to uncover the parties' intent. They also take into consideration how the treatment of
the contract will aect contracting parties dierent from the parties before them but aected
6 9 Exch. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145. (Court of Exchequer, 1854).
7See also Ayres and Gertner (1989) and Bebchuk and Shavell (1991) for a discussion of the Hadley rule
and its role in promoting disclosure of information. See Maskin (2006) for a critical view.Luca Anderlini, Leonardo Felli and Andrew Postlewaite 5
by the court's ruling via precedents.
In this paper, the Court (or the legislature, as discussed above) achieves its goal of enhanc-
ing eciency by means of anticipated actions that are akin to \mandatory" or \immutable"
rules; rules that the contracting parties cannot modify at the negotiation stage. These rules
need to be mandatory given the conict of interest, described above, between the objectives
of the parties at the contracting stage and the court's objectives. Interestingly, in the extant
literature the discussion of Hadley vs. Baxendale, on the other hand, has mainly focused
on the use of \default" rules, rules that apply only in the absence of explicit contractual
provisions by the parties.
1.2. Related Literature
In Section 2 of their Chapter for the Handbook of Law and Economics (Polinsky and Shavell,
2007), Hermalin, Katz, and Craswell (2007) oer a systematic and comprehensive review of
the existing literature presenting arguments \for" and \against" the \freedom of contract."
This paper is a contribution to this literature, presenting a robust set of circumstances in
which the case \against" the \freedom of contract" (interpreted in its broadest sense) prevails.
Their systematic and authoritative survey discusses the roles of traditional (third-party)
externalities, asymmetric information, market power, bounded rationality, and distributional
fairness as possible set ups for the case in favor of restricting the parties' freedom to contract
at will. Our contribution is one that reinforces the case for such partial restrictions based on
asymmetric information.
There is a growing literature that explicitly models the role of courts in contractual
relationships. In a moral-hazard set-up, Bond (2009) analyzes optimal contracting between
parties when judges can impose an outcome other than the contracted outcome in exchange for
a bribe. Bond shows that in a simple agency model, this possibility will make the contracting
parties less likely to employ high-powered contracts. Usman (2002) also focuses on a moral-
hazard environment. He lays out a model in which contracts contain variables that are
not observable to courts unless a rational and self-interested judge exerts costly eort. His
analysis concentrates on contracting behavior and the incentive to breach when judges value
the correct ruling but dislike eort. Levy (2005) analyzes the trade-o that arises when the
judge in ruling on a dispute is, at the same time, trying to inuence the perception of the
public (or an evaluator) about his own ability. This trade-o can induce the judge to distortShould Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write? 6
his decision to avoid his decision being appealed and possibly reversed.
The courts in these papers are governed by a judge who maximizes his or her personal
utility. In contrast to these papers, there is a literature that analyzes courts that maximize the
expected welfare of the contracting parties. Posner (1998) analyzes whether a court should
consider information extrinsic to the contract in interpreting the contract. Closer to the
current paper, Ayres and Gertner (1989) and Bebchuk and Shavell (1991) analyze the degree
to which courts' interpretation of contracts aect incentives to reveal private information.
The focus of this work is the eect of dierent court rules regarding damages for breach of
contract on the incentives for parties to disclose information regarding the costs of breach at
the time of contracting. Shavell (2006) presents a general examination of the role of courts
in interpreting contracts.
The present paper analyzes the role of a welfare-maximizing court that can aect the
type of contracts that are written by excusing performance (voiding the contract) in some
circumstances. The possibility of welfare improvements are a consequence of the eect of the
court's rules for enforcing contracts on the parties' incentives to reveal private information.
Our paper diers from Ayres and Gertner (1989), and Bebchuk and Shavell (1991) in that
we focus on the externality that informed contracting parties may impose on uninformed
contracting parties, which is absent from these papers. In fact in both of these contributions,
the welfare gains from information disclosure stem from the fact that once information is
disclosed a dierent action can be implemented by one of the contracting parties.8 By
contrast, in this paper, failure to disclose leads to a transaction with negative surplus being
executed which is to the advantage of the \bad type" of one of the contracting sides (seller),
but decreases overall welfare at the same time.
In dierent contexts, several papers have made the point that in the presence of asymmet-
ric information ineciency may arise (Aghion and Hermalin, 1990, Hammond, 2005, Spier,
1992). These papers show that cream skimming (Hammond, 2005) and in general, the in-
centive to signal private information can yield inecient (and possibly incomplete) contracts
(Spier, 1992) and hence welfare can be enhanced by limiting (by means of the law or regu-
lations) these signalling possibilities (Aghion and Hermalin, 1990). Our paper diers from
8In both cases, this is the level of eort of one of the parties; specically the level of \care" exercised by
Baxendale in Hadley vs. Baxendale | see footnote 6 above.Luca Anderlini, Leonardo Felli and Andrew Postlewaite 7
this branch of the literature in that in our environment the ineciencies arise because of the
lack of disclosure of private information, rather than a tendency to ineciency-generating
signaling. Our Court, by not enforcing certain contracts, may enhance ex-ante eciency by
facilitating and not hampering the disclosure of private information.
A paper that similarly addresses the role of a court in dealing with contractual issues
is Schwartz and Scott (2003). In that paper the authors advocate a Commercial Law that
diers from current US arrangements in three main respects. When disciplining trade be-
tween sophisticated parties in the absence of any externalities, Commercial Law should limit
considerably the use of default rules (rules that apply in the absence of explicit prescriptions
by the contracting parties). The rationale for this prescription is that general default rules
simply increase the transaction costs faced by the sophisticated contracting parties. More-
over, Contract Law should limit any ambiguities in the way contractual clauses are enforced,
and therefore minimize the chances of having to resort to a Court's (uncertain) interpretation
of existing rules. Finally, Commercial law should specify no \mandatory" or \immutable"
rules that the parties cannot change.
Clearly the prescriptions in Schwartz and Scott (2003) dier substantially from the conclu-
sions we draw in this paper. In the environment we describe, in the presence of sophisticated
but asymmetrically informed parties mandatory rules might be desirable; they are welfare
enhancing.
The literature on mandatory rules is large, and we refer the reader to the comprehensive
contribution of Hermalin, Katz, and Craswell (2007). Perhaps the most prominent advocate
of the absence of mandatory rules is Posner (2003), who argues that contract theory cannot
prescribe \universally" useful contractual prohibitions, and hence, the case against mandatory
rules is sealed. Craswell (2003) on the other hand persuasively (in our view) argues that the
fact that contract theory is unable to oer \universal" conclusions does not imply that, on
balance, across a pool of heterogeneous cases, mandatory rules may not be justied. Hermalin
and Katz (1993) argue that, in general mandatory rules will not have benecial eects when
contracting takes place in a \screening" set up. Their conclusion is of course consistent with
the main message coming out of the literature on wasteful signaling that we discussed above.
Lastly, the welfare enhancing court intervention (or mandatory rule, or regulation) that
we identify here is to impose a price-cap in some cases. The literature on price caps goesShould Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write? 8
back a long way in Industrial Organization, with arguments for and against price caps as, for
example, a way to contain the eects of market power.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to survey this eld, and the reader is referred to
textbooks such as Clarkson and Miller (1982), Tirole (1988), Carlton and Perlo (1994) or
more recently Bellamme and Peitz (2010). It is interesting to note that our results support
a welfare-enhancing role for price-caps in a context with asymmetric information. This seems
to be novel as far as we are aware. In contrast to our results, Earle, Schmedders, and Tatur
(2007) nd that under conditions of price uncertainty price-caps can have important negative
welfare eects.
2. A Simple Example
2.1. Basics
Our central point can be made via a simple example.9 There are a buyer B and a seller S,
with a single indivisible object (a \widget") potentially available for trade.
The seller has private information at the time of contracting. He knows his type, which
can be either b(ad) or g(ood). Each type is equally likely, and the buyer does not know S's
type.
Depending on S's type the value and cost of the widget are either vb and cb or vg and cg
respectively. A seller of type b is \bad news" in two ways. First, the cost of the widget is
higher. Second, while the surplus for a good seller is positive, it is negative when the seller
is bad. In other words, we assume that
cg < cb and vb   cb < 0 < vg   cg (1)




which of course | together with (1) | implies that expected surplus is positive.
9We refer the interested reader to our working paper (Anderlini, Felli, and Postlewaite, 2006) for a richer
model that allows some additional points to be brought to the fore. In particular, our set up here does not
allow us to focus on the possibility that an ambiguous Court may also be welfare improving. We return to
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The informed seller makes a take-it-or-leave-it oer of a price p to the uninformed buyer.10
The buyer then accepts or rejects. If the oer is rejected both earn a payo of zero.
2.2. Courts
As we mentioned above, our courts are Stackelberg leaders. They announce which contracts
will be enforced and which will be voided. To see specically what eects a voiding rule will
have on the equilibrium of the model, we need to specify the | o-the-equilibrium-path as
it turns out | payos associated with contracts that the court will void.
Suppose that the seller oers a contract that the court has announced it will void, pos-
sibly with a buyer who accepts the oer. What are the correct payos to the parties in this
case? Obviously there is considerable latitude in specifying these values. One could imagine
penalties for oering and/or accepting the contract. Or a seller who winds up with positive
probability delivering the widget | and thus incurring the cost | but, not having recourse
to a court, unable to exact the payment from the buyer. Further, we could imagine rela-
tionship specic ex-ante investments that are not recouped once the contract is voided and
renegotiation takes place.11
Our results below are robust to the precise specication of payos associated with a voided
contract. They remain true provided that oering a contract that is accepted and then voided
by the court is no better than no transaction at all as far as the seller is concerned. In other
words, it is sucient that somehow a contract that is voided by the court prevents trade from
taking place.
10Extreme bargaining power in favor of the informed seller greatly simplies the analysis. Results with the
same avor can easily be obtained in situations with intermediate bargaining power. What seems important
is that the bargaining power should not reside entirely with the uninformed side.
11As in Anderlini, Felli, and Postlewaite (2006) a relationship-specic ex-ante investment could yield no
trade when the court voids the contractual agreement. Assume, for simplicity, that while the seller has all the
bargaining power at an ex-ante stage if the contract is voided and parties trade ex-post the bargaining power
shifts to the buyer. Then postulate a relationship-specic investment stage in which the informed seller can
invest or not, with the trade surplus vanishing if S does not invest. If the contract is voided by the court,
the parties then enter a renegotiation stage in which the buyer has all the bargaining power so he makes a
take-it-or-leave-it oer to the seller. This clearly will expropriate any surplus the seller may have enjoyed
(his investment is sunk at that stage) implying that if the seller expects the court to void the contract he will
not invest and hence trade will not occur. We do not make explicit the formalities of this \addition" to the
model since they are straightforward and do not add much to the intuitive outline we have just given here.Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write? 10
2.3. Equilibrium With A Passive Court
As we suggested above, when all contracts are enforced inecient pooling can obtain in
equilibrium. When the value of the good widget, vg, is suciently high, there will typically
be multiple pooling equilibria in which both types of seller oer the same price. When the
seller types pool, the buyer will not know which type of widget is being oered, and will value
it at the average of the values of the good and bad widget. As long as the price oered by
the seller is below this average value, the buyer will accept the oer. The optimal pooling
contract for the seller is than one in which the price at which the widget is oered, p, is the
average value: (vg + vb)=2, since any oer at a higher price will be rejected.
There may also exist a separating equilibrium in which the two types of seller oer dierent
prices, pg 6= pb and in doing so they reveal their type. When the prices oered by the two
types of seller dier, the buyer will not accept the oer at price pb if pb > vb: Since vb < cb,
any price pb at which the buyer would be willing to buy would result in a loss for the seller.
Hence, for there to be a separating equilibrium with dierent prices oered by the two types
of sellers, the buyer must reject the oer from the bad seller, which results in a payo of 0
to that seller. This can be optimal for the bad seller if pg  cb; in this case, the price oered
by the good seller is less than or equal to the cost of the bad seller, and consequently the
bad seller cannot gain by oering the good seller's price pg. We have assumed that cg < cb,
so there can be separating equilibria in which the two types oer prices pg 6= pb, pg 2 [cg;cb],
with the buyer accepting the oer at pg and rejecting the oer at pb.12
The payo is 0 to the bad seller in any separating equilibrium, while the payo to the good
seller in any separating equilibrium is obviously highest when pg = cb. If (vg +vb)=2 > cb, the
optimal pooling equilibrium described above is the best possible equilibrium for both types
of seller. We summarize this argument in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Equilibrium with a Passive Court: Suppose the court enforces all contracts.
For vb suciently large, there is a unique equilibrium that is optimal for both types of seller
in which they pool in oering to trade at the same price p = (vb + vg)=2.13
12If the buyer's beliefs are that prices other than pb and pg are oered by a bad seller, oers at these prices
will be rejected.
13We focus on the equilibrium in this example that is optimal for both types of seller because it is eminently
plausible. We should note, however, that it is the unique equilibrium in this example that satises the
undefeated re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A pooling equilibrium in which the buyer is accepting the oer from both types of seller
is clearly inecient. The expected surplus in this case is equal to
WP =
vb   cb + vg   cg
2
(3)
which, by (1) is obviously lower than what expected surplus would be in a rst best scenario






2.4. Equilibrium With An Active Court
We now consider a court that actively intervenes and voids some contracts. In so doing the
court will be able to induce separation between the two types of seller and increase expected
welfare. The court can adopt a simple policy of voiding \extreme" contracts by imposing a
price cap. This will rule out the range of prices at which the bad seller wants to pool, thus
forcing separation, and hence preventing the sale from taking place when the seller is bad.
This, as we remarked above, will raise expected surplus from WP, as in (3), to WF, as in (4).
Proposition 2. Equilibrium with an Active Court: Assume the court announces that it will
void all contracts with a price p exceeding some price cap p such that cg  p < minfvg;cbg.
Then there is a unique equilibrium payo that weakly Pareto dominates all other equilibrium
payos for both types of seller. This payo is obtained when the two types of seller separate:
the good seller oers a price p and the bad seller does not transact.
Suppose that we have a pooling equilibrium at an oered price p = pb = pg  p. Since
p < cb, the bad seller will have a negative payo if the oer is accepted. He can do better
by not trading, which he can accomplish by setting a suciently high price. Hence, the only
possibility of a pooling equilibrium at which p is oered by both types of seller must involve
the buyer refusing.
There will be separating equilibria in which the good seller announces a price pg 2 (cg;p]
and the bad seller does not trade (say, but announcing a price pb > vg).14 Since pg > cg
14We assume that any other oered price is believed to come from the bad seller.Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write? 12
assures that the good seller has a positive payo at this price, pg  p guarantees both that
the seller will accept the oer and the court will not void the contract, and pg  cg assures
that the bad seller cannot get a positive payo by replicating the good seller's oer.
Thus, when the court uses this rule to void contracts, the bad seller cannot obtain a posi-
tive payo at any equilibrium. The unique equilibrium payo that weakly Pareto dominates
all other equilibrium payos entails the good seller setting pg = p and the bad seller not
trading.
3. Conclusion
When contracting parties are asymmetrically informed a benevolent court, that maximizes
the parties' ex-ante welfare, can enhance eciency by voiding certain aspects of the contract
that the parties at the negotiation stage would like the court to uphold. In particular, our
example above shows that the court can accomplish this by voiding extreme contracts: trading
contracts that specify very high prices.
In a more general setting the welfare enhancing role of the court can take dierent forms
of intervention. For example in Anderlini, Felli, and Postlewaite (2006) the court can enhance
eciency by voiding the trade of a specic widget whatever the specied price. Moreover,
eciency can be further increased if the court's intervention does not occur with certainty.
In other, words the incentives of the informed party to reveal his private information at the
negotiation stage are enhanced by the mere possibility (but not necessarily the certainty)
of the court's intervention. In Anderlini, Felli, and Postlewaite (2006) this is achieved by
the court committing, at the ex-ante stage, to randomize with a given probability between
voiding and upholding the trade of a given widget. The randomizing behavior of a court may
appear at rst glance an unrealistic one. We do not think so. Indeed, in order to create the
right incentives to the parties to disclose the relevant private information it is enough that
the existing body of precedents is ambiguous enough to lead the parties to believe that the
relevant aspect of the contract will be voided by the court with the desired probability. It
is undeniable that in reality laws and the body of precedents are suciently ambiguous in
many cases.
Our main result (Propositions 1 and 2) can be viewed as identifying a kind of \second
best" phenomenon in an incomplete contract world. We start with a model in which some
degree of contractual incompleteness is assumed (the costs and values of each widget are notLuca Anderlini, Leonardo Felli and Andrew Postlewaite 13
veriable and hence not contractible). In this world it is in fact welfare-improving to impose
further incompleteness by making some contracts eectively impossible in equilibrium. This
is what our active court does. This is similar to the nding in Bernheim and Whinston
(1998) that under some conditions, when one assumes that contracts are exogenously coarse,
equilibrium contracts may be even coarser than the constraints impose. However, our main
result diers from theirs in that it does not assert that contracts will be coarse (or incomplete)
in equilibrium. Rather it asserts that imposing further incompleteness can increase expected
welfare.
We conclude by remarking again that the prescriptions we have derived that pinpoint
how active courts should intervene can also be interpreted as telling us how mandatory rules
should be designed. This paper is, in a sense, agnostic about this. In either case we identify
the welfare enhancing role of an ex-ante commitment to void certain aspects of a contract.
Whether we can interpret our results as indicating a role for active courts or a role for
mandatory rules depends on whether the rule that the Court commits to is the result of an
accumulated body of precedents (it is case law) or instead is part of a statute designed by a
legislator. As we noted in the introduction, the information on which the court can condition
its intervention is likely to be ner than that available to the legislators designing mandatory
rules.
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